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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the utility of interorganizational linkages for
social service agencies. Specifically, it examines the determinants of
agencies' attempts to establish interorganizational linkages which are
intrumental to the achievement of their goals. It was found that a smaller
agency budget and the need to provide a wide range of services facilitate
the establishment of those linkages that are of high intrumental value to
the agency. To a lesser extent, the presence of an appropriate decision
making mechanism within the agency and the ability to freely establish
and maintain relations with other organizations are also found to be
contributing factors.
In addition, the study also shows that agencies which maintain linkages
of low intrumental value with many other organizations feel that they are being
dominated by their environment. This finding highlights the importance of ;
examining the organizational and contextual condtions affecting an organization's
ability to interact with only those organizations perceived to be instrumental
to its success.

The fundamental purpose of this study is to increase our understand-
ing of the interorganizational linkage formation process. The commonly
held view is that interorganizational relations are instituted because they
are perceived by the focal organization as being instrumental for control-
ling its environment. However, a review of the literature indicates that
very little research has attempted to test this basic assumption. Indeed,
as noted in Whetten and Aldrich (1977), past research has by and large
not been concerned with identifying the conditions under which it is ap-
propriate to follow the prevailing theories' assumptions regarding the
process of establishing interorganizational relations. Specifically, we
are concerned that the resource control model appears to be based on
highly restrictive assumptions regarding the autonomy of, and decision
making criteria used by, administrators in forming linkages. Conse-
quently, it seems important to investigate the organizational and environ-
mental conditions under which this framework is likely to accurately model
the linkage formation process. To do this we will test hypotheses regard-
ing conditions under which public agencies are likely to establish link-
ages with various groups of community organizations primarily on the
basis of their perceived utility in aiding the focal organization to ful-
fill its mission. Following this we will investigate whether interorgani-
zational linkages, regardless of the original purpose for their establish-
ment, appear to generate a perception that the organization is able to
control its environment. In this manner the paper will be examining the
factors which affect whether interorganizational relations will be es-
tablished for their instrumental value and whether linkages once established
are perceived as having such a value.
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Background
The literature on interorganizational relations suggests that linkages
are established by an organization based on their perceived instrumental
value for enhancing organizational performance. Current theories in this
area posit that the principal value of interorganizational linkages is
increased control over environmental contingencies— the most notable of
which being the availability of resources. Thompson (1967) proposed that
under norms of rationality, organizations will attempt to reduce their
dependence on resources controlled by other organizations by negotiating
a long-term contract; coopting the controlling organization; establishing
a joint venture with the controlling organization involving an exchange
of resources between both parties; or by forming an agreement at better
terms with a third party. These strategies are consistent with March and
Simon's (1958) proposition that organizations avoid having to anticipate
environmental action by arranging negotiated environments.
This paradigm is clearly visible in the work that has been done on
interagency coordination. As outlined by Turk, "The need for interorgan-
izational relations is probably related to awareness of organizations of
interdependence with other organizations and results in attempts at
coordination." (1973, p. 40). The role of organizational interdependence
as a stimulus for coordination has been repeatedly noted in the litera-
ture (cf., Hage and Aiken, 1967; Litwak and Rothman, 1970; Lehman, 1975;
Reed, 1969; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; and Whetten, 1977a). Although there
is some disagreement regarding the direction of causation between inter-
dependence and the establishment of joint programs (Pfeffer and Nowak,
1976, p. 400), clearly coordination is viewed as an environment-controlling
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strategy. This joint effort to control the participating organizations'
environments is accomplished by increasing the predictability of resource
flow, maintaining a clear domain of high social importance and extending
the application and defense of the agency's paradigm (Benson, 1975).
An extreme form of the basic environment-controlling paradigm is rep-
resented by the work of Yuchtman and Seashore (1967). They proposed that
resource control should serve as the principal criterion for measuring
organizational effectiveness. Following this model an organization is
effective to the extent that it is capable of dominating other organiza-
tions in its task environment.
In reviewing the early development of the environmental control model
it is clear that it was originally conceptualized at the organization-
environment level of analysis rather than the interorganizational level.
The difference being that the former perspective leaves the mechanisms
whereby an organization controls its environment specified whereas the
latter focuses explicitly on formal linkages between organizations. It
is interesting to note, however, that research on interorganizational
relations at the dyadic and organizational set level has typically uti-
lized an environment-controlling framework. For instance, Aldrich (1976)
and Benson (1973, 1975) proposed that organizational administrators es-
tablish a network of relations for the purpose of maintaining an orderly
and reliable flow of resources. Effective control of the environment is
held to be a function of the centrality of an organization's location
within a network of relations and its linkages with organizations outside
the immediate network (e.g., support from a national federation) (Benson,
1975; Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Rogers, 1974).
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As we have previously noted (Whetten and Aldrich, 1977), this line
of reasoning assumes that the decision to establish interorganizational
linkages is the outcome of a very deliberate and thoughtful process. This
is exemplified by a scenario in which an organizational administrator ob-
serves a decrease in organizational performance and concludes from his
analysis of the problem that the organization needs to obtain resource Y
which is supplied by organizations A and B. He then proceeds to evaluate
these alternative suppliers on the basis of their price, delivery time,
stability of supply, etc., and on the basis of this assessment he initiates
an agreement with the organization proposing the most favorable terms.
It is important to note that this view of decision making contains two
key assumptions: (1) that the administrator has considerable freedom to
choose between alternatives; and (2) that he does so on the basis of what
are generally considered to be rational /economic considerations.
While the rational decision making model has been strongly criticized
(cf., March and Simon, 1958; Weick, 1969; March and Olson, 1976), our
purpose presently is not to argue that an administrator does not attempt
to base his decisions to establish and maintain linkages on his percep-
tion of their contribution to organizational effectiveness, rather our
objective is to draw attention to the multitude of factors which inter-
fere with this type of deliberate, "rational" decision making process
and consequently suggest limitations on the unbridled utilization of the
resource control model in studies of interorganizational relations,
especially in the public sector.
We will draw attention to two sets of constraints on utilizing this
model of the linkage formation process, namely, environmental conditions
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which limit the autonomy of public agency administrators to freely choose
between organizations in establishing linkages and organizational condi-
tions which may restrict the use of rational criteria in deciding between
alternative linkage possibilities. One of the principal environmental
constraints on the autonomy of public agency administrators is the fact
that some linkages are essentially forced on the participating organiza-
tions by third parties. This type of relationship can be the result of
a legal directive, or a formal agreement between the heads of the respec-
tive federal or state systems to which local agencies belong (Whetten,
1977b; Hall et al., 1974; Aldrich, 1976a). It may also be stimulated by
pressures from organized client groups or leaders of local coordination
councils as they push to improve the quality of the local social service
delivery system. Additional programmatic-related constraints on an ad-
ministrator's discretion to initiate interorganizational relations in-
clude the size of his budget, the type of services the agency is mandated
to provide, the number of staff allowed and the number of organizations
in the community (Whetten and Aldrich, 1977).
Regardless of the administrator's decision making autonomy we expect
that there are a number of internal organizational factors which may ob-
struct his inclination to utilize highly "rational" criteria in choosing
between linkage alternatives. For instance, the establishment of linkages
which are less than optimal may result from staff biases regarding the
legitimacy and status of other agencies, organizational traditions and
precedents regarding the appropriate means for obtaining referrals and
placing clients, and power struggles within the organization regarding
the future image of the organization as reflected in its network of clients.
•Si: ,
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The fundamental purpose of this study, then, is to explore the ob-
stacles faced by administrators attempting to maximize the benefits and
minimize the costs resulting from interorganizational relations. We will
do this by testing three hypotheses regarding organizational and contextual
factors which impinge on the linkage establishment process. We will also
examine those cases in which the number of linkages which an agency has
established with a group of organizations (e.g., hospitals and health
care clinics) is not consistent with the administrator's perceived instru-
mental value of that type of organization. Through our investigation of
these discrepancies we hope to gain additional insights into the condi-
tions under which the resource control model is appropriate for describ-
ing the linkage formation process.
Hypotheses
We expect that the degree to which an agency is interacting primarily
with organizations of high instrumental value will be a function of three
factors. These are the extent to which the organization has: (1) a strong
need to be selective in choosing partners for their interorganizational
relations; (2) the opportunity to freely establish and discontinue rela-
tions with other organizations; and (3) the appropriate internal decision
making mechanism.
Public agencies which operate federally or state sponsored social
service programs are highly constrained by the hierarchial system govern-
ing their programs. The parent institution serves as the principal source
of funding and as such it exercises considerable control over the utili-
zation of these funds by local agency directors. Specifically, they
-.
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dictate the types of staff position that can be funded and the types of
services they can dispense to clients. Therefore, since social service
agencies in a community operate within several different hierarchial
systems they are likely to differ in terms of the level of funding and the
range of services they have been authorized to offer. In Whetten and
Aldrich (1977) it has been demonstrated that a large financial resource
base (budget) is conducive to establishing a highly diversified organi-
zation set. This finding is consistent with Litwak and Rothman's argu-
ment that, "organizations with 'extra resources' are often best able to
link with others" (1970, p. 156). In labor intensive people processing
organizations (Hazenfeld, 1972) large budgets are converted into a large
staff which provides the organization with an increased capacity to
establish and maintain linkages. Paradoxically, it has also been argued
that poor ties to resource bases outside the community will motivate an
organization to establish linkages with other local organizations as a
means of enlarging its resource base (Benson, 1975; Levine and White,
1961; Hage and Aiken, 1967). Since it takes resources (e.g., staff
time), to establish and maintain linkages agencies with small budgets
will have a high need for linkages but a small "stake" to invest in
establishing them. We expect that organizations in this situation will
be highly motivated to examine the instrumental value of a linkage be-
fore they decide to initiate it.
We expect that the need for being selective in establishing linkages
is also stimulated by a wide scope of services. We have shown (Whetten
and Aldrich, 1977) that when an organization is providing a wide range
of supportive services to its clients, in addition to basic services such
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as training, employment placement and counseling, the organization inter-
acts with a larger and more diverse set of organizations. For instance,
if an agency is providing medical examinations as an auxilliary service,
it will need to establish linkages with local health organizations. This
has important implication for how carefully organizations select inter-
acting partners. We expect that establishing linkages with 50 organiza-
tions distributed evenly across 9 different categories is a more difficult
task than if they are all in four or five categories. This is due to the
fact that it is generally more difficult for an agency to establish a
linkage with the first hospital than the second or third. The first
linkage provides knowledge about hospital programs and administrative
policies, as well as acquaintances which can be used as references in
the future. Consequently, we expect that given a fixed resource base
(in terms of staff time) for interacting with other organizations, an
agency offering a broad range of services to its clients would be high-
ly constrained to interact only with those organizations which are per-
ceived to have high instrumental value. This leads us to our first
hypothesis, which is:
Hypothesis #1: Organizations with a small budget and/or
a wide range of services will be more likely to inter-
act with other organizations which have high instrumental
value.
Perceived need alone, however, is not sufficient to guarantee that
all linkages will have instrumental value. It is possible that an agency
may be aware of excellent training or employment opportunities in other
organizations but has difficulty placing its clients in them and there-
fore must settle for inferior alternatives. This lack of access may be
->(>
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caused by the agency's poor image in the community. Benson (1976) has
stressed that public agencies must establish a strong base of legitimacy
among local community leaders as a prerequisite to obtaining resources
controlled by other organizations. Since it has been shown that community
leaders' ratings of the effectiveness of these agencies is strongly in-
fluenced by their familiarity with the organizations' members (Whetten,
1977), it follows that if an organization announces a limited number of
openings and several agencies are competing for these positions, preferen-
tial treatment will be extended along acquaintance or friendship lines.
This conclusion points out the need to better understand the mechanisms
whereby an agency can increase its visibility in the community.
In his original treatise on organization sets, Evan (1966) proposed
that if boundary spanners have a large personal role set, then it is like-
ly that organization would also have a large organization set. This hy-
pothesis was borne out by Whetten and Aldrich (1977) inasmuch as we found
that one of the best predictors of the number of relations an organization
had established was the activity rate of the staff in local fraternal
types of organizations. Following Turk's work (1973) in this area we
posited that these institutions increase social intergration in the com-
munity by providing people with information regarding the interests and
resources held by others.
Increased visibility and legitimacy may also result from the staff
members previously holding positions in other local organizations. A
request to establish an exchange coming from a former co-worker is more
likely to be honored than one coming from a total stranger. This pro-
position is similar to Perruci and Pilisuk's (1970) finding that community
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inf luentials hold positions in several organizations. As an extension
of their work, we expect that personal influence may result not only from
being linked to several organizations simultaneously, but also from se-
quentially holding positions in several organizations over time.
An organization set which includes many linkages that have relative-
ly low instrumental value may result not only from the organization's
inability to establish preferred linkages, but also from its failure to
discontinue less than optimal relationships which have been previously
established. This may be due either to the organization not having the
right to discontinue the relationship, or its failure to take the in-
itiative (which is legally theirs) to sever the relationship.
It is common for an organization to attract interactions because of
its reputation or its control over scarce resources, e.g., the employment
service's exclusive right to job placement. In these cases the focal
organization may receive only marginal benefits from an interaction com-
pared to the resources it expends in maintaining the linkage. A strictly
rational/economic model of decision making would argue that an organiza-
tion in this position would discontinue the relationship. Hov/ever, this
may not take place if the organization has such a large set of relation-
ships that it is difficult to continually assess the cost/benefit ratio
of each linkage. When an organization has a very large organization set
relative to its number of staff, the staff would have little time to
reflectively evaluate the worth of their boundary spanning activities*
Under these conditions we would expect that precedent and tradition would
act as powerful forces for perpetuating the status quo.
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Hypothesis #2: Organizations with small organization
sets and staff members who are actively involved in
several voluntary associations and have previously held
several positions in other organizations will be more
likely to interact with organizations which have high
instrumental value.
The third factor which is likely to affect whether an organization
establishes linkages of high instrumental value is whether or not it has
established adequate structural mechanisms for internally disseminating
environmental information and for making environment-controlling decisions
based on this information. Information regarding the desirability and
undesirability of interacting with other organizations enters an organi-
zation by means of the various boundary spanning activities we have men-
tioned. If information coming into an organization regarding such things
as new job openings, alternatives to existing client exchange agreements
and planned changes in funding for local training programs fails to be
channeled to the appropriate decision makers, then decisions to initiate
or continue linkages with a less than optimal cost/benefit ratio may be
made. In relatively small organizations staff meetings serve as an ex-
cellent information disseminating mechanism. In Whetten and Aldrich
(1977) we found a positive correlation between organization set size
and the number of staff meetings held. While we are not totally certain
about the direction of causality it does appear that information re-
garding the organization set is being exchanged in these staff meetings.
An additional factor which we feel is likely to influence the ef-
fectiveness of the decision making process is the level of centralization
in the organization. It has been shown that centralization increases
both the number of joint programs engaged in (Hage and Aiken, 1967) and
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the overall size of the organization set (Whetten and Aldrich, 1977). The
traditional view is that authority to make decisions regarding how to con-
trol the environment through boundary spanning activities should be dele-
gated to boundary spanners since they have the most accurate and current
information about the environment. However, decentralization of authority
typically also results in a loss of scope in the decision making process.
While a given boundary spanner may have very current information regard-
ing opportunities for establishing linkages with the organizations he
interacts with, he is not likely to be aware of alternatives discovered
by other staff members. Consequently, if each boundary spanner were em-
powered to commit his organization to an exchange relationship, the
resulting organization set would likely contain many redundant and less
than optimal linkages. We expect, therefore, that centralization of
authority will result in an organization set with an overall higher
quality of relationships because key decisions are based on a broad scope
of information about the various resource-controlling alternatives.
Senior officials are likely to possess a broad scope of information
regarding environment controlling options not only because they are
presently located at the apex of the organization's communication net-
work, but also because of their previous experience within the organi-
zation. This type of public agency tends to fill vacancies in senior
positions by promoting their own personnel, consequently, top adminis-
trators tend to have the longest tenure in the organization. As a result,
their knowledge of the stability and integrity of previous agreements
with various organizations would aid them in choosing between current
alternatives. For instance, a community organization's history of
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unre liability in fulfilling commitments to the focal organization in the
past might cause an administrator to veto a proposal from a less experi-
enced staff member to initiate a joint program with the organization.
Hypothesis #3: Organizations with frequent communica-
tions via staff meetings and centralization of authority
would be more likely to interact with organizations
which have high instrumental value.
A summary of these hypotheses is shown in Figure 1.
At this point our focus shifts from the effect of perceived instru-
mental value on the establishment of interorganizational linkages to the
effect of linkages on the organization's ability to control its environ-
ment. We have previously proposed that a large and diversified organiza-
tion set would be beneficial to a people processing public agency because
of its resource-controlling potential. A large part of the success of
the agency is dependent upon their successfully placing their clients in
training and employment positions in other organizations. Therefore the
larger and broader their set of contacts in the community, the more degrees
of freedom they would have for client placement (Jacobs, 1974). One way
of testing this propostion is co ask the staff members how much control
they feel the organization has over the environment. We would expect that
their response should be positively correlated with the size and diversity
of their organization set.
However, we feel that it is important to look beyond the effects of
the objective characteristics of the organization set alone. In this
paper we have stressed the fact that the resource-controlling process it-
self consumes resoux-ces. Consequently, if an agency is interacting with
many organizations because it must, because it has failed to recognize
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the inefficiencies of the current relationships, or because it is unable
to gain access to more desirable alternatives, it is possible that the
staff will not feel that their linkages with other organizations are very
beneficial. This line of reasoning would suggest that perceived impor-
tance of the interacting organizations might 3erve as a mediating variable
between the objective characteristics of the organization set and the
staff's perception of the consequences of these interorganizational link-
ages. To test this we will examine those organizations which have large
organization sets but which also rate the instrumental values of their
interacting organizations as being low. If the staff in these organiza-
tions recognize that their linkages have a poor cost/benefit ratio then
we would expect them to report that their organizations are being con-
trolled by their environment rather thau vice versa.
Hypothesis #4: When considered by themselves, organiza-
tion set size and diversity will be positively correlated
with perceived control over the environment. However, we
expect that this relationship will be moderated by per-
ceived importance of the linkages, to the extent that
agencies which are interacting with many unimportant
organizations will report that they are being dominated
by their environments
This hypothesis is similar to Pondy's (1977) proposition that people
have high social power only when th y can both initiate interactions with
others in the organization and buffer themselves from the initiatives of
others. At the organizational level we will be examining the cases in
which organizations appear to be vulnerable to initiatives to establish
relationships which are not mutually beneficial.
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Methods
This study is part of a larger investigation of the manpower training
system in New York State (Whetten, 1974). Information on 67 manpower
agencies located in several New York communities (excluding New York City)
was collected during the summer of 1973. The sample consisted of Employ-
ment Service offices, Neighborhood Youth Corps, MDT Skill Training Centers
and On-The-Job Training Programs. Two different survey instruments were
used to collect data on variables used in this study. Information about
the internal operation and structure of the agency was obtained from self-
administered questionnaires completed by the professional staff and the
director. Information about an agency's interactions with other organi-
zations was obtained from the director's responses to our master list of
organizations for each community. The master list contained a compilation
of every known public and non-profit organization located in the agency's
community. It was compiled over a two year period from community direc-
tories supplied by local governments and social service coordinating
agencies. The list was validated by asking the directors of the manpower
organizations and the heads of the Social Service Department and Chamber
of Commerce in each community to check the list for omissions and errors
several months before the study. Organizations contained on the master
list were classified into nine sectors, or types, comprising the agency's
task environment. A description of the nine sectors is shown in Appendix
I. The size of the organization set was computed by counting the number
The master list excluded private and profit-making businesses
because they were compiled in a much less systematic way.
,
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of organizations checked on the master list. The concentration of the
set was computed using Herfindahl's 'H* statistic (Adelman, 1969) which
increases in value as the organizations in the set are concentrated in a
few sectors.
A rating of the perceived importance of each of the nine sectors for
the successful fulfillment of the organization's mission was obtained from
the agency's director. Each sector was rated on a 7-point scale. To re-
duce the possibility that this rating might be biased by the number of
interacting organizations identified in each sector by the agency heads,
they were not informed of the particular sector into which each organiza-
tion on the master list has been classified. In addition, the master list
and the questionnaire were not administered simultaneously. The staff's
perception of the organization's control over its environment was as-
sessed by asking the agency's director: the 7-point response scale
ranging from "the environment dominates the organization" to "the organi-
zation dominates its environment." The questions measuring the instru-
mental value of each sector and the organization's control over its
environment were actually asked of all the professional staff members.
However, we decided to use only the agency director's response for the
following reasons: 1. Using an analysis of variance test we found that
the agency directors' responses were not significantly different from
the average response of the rest of the staff. 2. This approach avoids
2
N a
i 2The formula for the H statistic is H Z (—7 )
i
A
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the sticky problem of aggregating purely perceptual data to form an organ-
izational score. 3. The agency director filled out the mast list for his
organization and inasmuch as we had taken precautions to avoid contamina-
tion between the instruments we felt it was advantageous to use the agency
director' 8 rating of the sectors in order to hold constant the respondent's
familiarity with the organization set. 4. As we have already indicated,
the agency director tends to have the longest tenure in the organization,
so we felt he was our most reliable informant (Seidler, 1974).
The relationship between the perceived importance of the organiza-
tions in the nine sectors of the task environment and the number of
linkages with organizations in each sector was measured by computing the
Pearson correlation coefficient between the two sets of nine scores for
each of the focal manpower organizations. This variable is labelled
INSTVALUE, for instrumental value.
Because of the nature of the particular internal organizational
characteristics we were using for independent variables, e.g., the staff's
participation in decision making and their activity in local voluntary
organizations, we did not feel that it was wise to rely on only a single
response from the agency director (Seidler, 1974). Consequently, we have
included those questions in Appendix II which were asked of the entire
professional staff on each manpower organization and combined into a
single score.
3
For a discussion of our aggregration procedure for these variables
see Whetten and Aldrich, 1977.
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Results
To begin with, the correlation between the perceived importance of
a sector and the number of linkages with organizations in that sector for
each organization ranged from -.07 to +.92, with a median value of .34.
This range of correlations represents a remarkably high variance in the
goodness of fit between the utility of an organization's linkages and the
number of linkages it has established and underscores the need for a
better understanding of the factors which impinge on the linkage estab-
lishment process.
To test our hypotheses regarding the factors which affect the degree
to which interorganizational relations are established for their instru-
mental value we ran a regression of INSTVALUE on the organizational
variables. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1. Overall,
they provide strong support for hypothesis #1 and moderate support for .
hypotheses #2 and #3. As we had predicted the relationship between the
number of linkages with a set of organizations and the focal organiza-
tion's perceived importance of that group is greatly influenced by the
size of the organization's financial base and the breadth of services
they provide. The need to establish relations with a broad range or
organizations on a small budget therefore appears to be a significant
determinant of a highly deliberate, "rational" decision making process.
Table 1 provides less support for our hypothesis #2 regarding an
organization's opportunity to freely establish and discontinue relations.
Visibility resulting from previous jobs appears to provide greater in-
formation about, and access to, the resources of other organizations than
visibility resulting from membership in local voluntary organizations.
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These results suggest that a person's latent role set based on past ac-
quaintances are more salient for gaining access to other organizations
than his active ties. However, since our two measures of the staff's
role sets also varied in terms of job vs. non-job activities, further
research in this area needs to be conducted before a definite conclusion
can be reached. It does appear, however, that our results here and in
Whetten and Aldrich (1976) points to definite opportunities for organiza-
tional leaders to capitalize on the personal role sets of their staff
members*
As part of this hypothesis we proposed that an organization with a
large set may find it difficult to continually weed out unproductive rela-
tionships* The significant beta of -.19 in Table 1 underscores the fact
that a large set size has both costs and benefits. While it reduces the
focal organization* 8 dependence on a small number of organizations, it
also appears to create new environment-management problems due to the
fact that it is difficult to continually assess the current value of a
large number of commitments. The result may be a classic problem of the
means becoming an end in and of itself as the perceived value of linkages
decreases but the relationships are perpetuated.
The results in Table 1 likewise provide partial support for hypothesis
#3. It appears that for these organizations the number of staff meetings
is not significantly related to the instrumental value of their organiza-
tion set. This may be due either to the fact that staff meetings are not
used in these agencies as a means of communicating information about the
task environment or that this type of communication is not taking place
at all. Since the number of staff meetings was shown to be an important
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predictor of organization set size (Whetten and Aldrich, 1977) it may be
that general organization/environment information (e.g., we need more
training opening to meet an increased demand from our clients) may be ex-
changed in the meetings but not details about specific linkage possibil-
ities. Further work on this topic would be fruitful for future research.
As predicted, centralization is positively related to INSTVALUE. It
appears that in small social service agencies it is important for linkage
formation decisions to be made by the senior staff members. Since they
generally have the longest tenure in the agency, they are likely to be
most familiar with past and current interorganizational relations. This
knowledge base would serve as a check on the information regarding new
opportunities for linkages obtained by less experienced boundary spanners.
The effect of a large and diversified organization set in the staff's
perception of their ability to control the environment (Hypothesis #4) is
shown in Table 2. These results indicate that a large and diverisifed
(the opposite of concentration) organization set is positively associated
with the staff's perception that the organization is controlling its en-
vironment. Considered by themselves, these results would suggest that
irrespective of why a linkage was established the effect of the linkage
is beneficial for the organization. Such a conclusion would mean that
our interest in obtaining a better understanding of the context within
which linkages are established is purely academic since it appears that
the nature of the linkage and the characteristics of the interacting or-
ganization have no consequence on an organization's perceived ability to
control its environment.
!'
. iS-.:.
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To test the validity of thia conclusion we treated perceived impor-
tance as a moderator for the relationship between the number of linkages
and environmental control. To do this we created a dummy variable repre-
senting the interaction between number of linkages and perceived importance
of the task environment by splitting both variables at their median value
and assigning weights of or 1 to form the interaction terms high linkages/
low importance and low linkages/high importance. If perceived importance
4
is not acting as a mediating variable then the partial correlations be-
tween these interaction terms and perceived environmental control should be
similar to the +.36 correlation for number of linkages along. Table 2
shows that this clearly is not the case since the correlation for the high
linkages/low importance condition is -.48. This reversal in the sign of
the correlation indicates that when organizations are interacting exten-
sively with unimportant organizations they feel powerless. This is a very
significant result. It confirms hypothesis #4 and reinforces the impor-
tance of our earlier results in Table 1 since it points out dramatically
the need to examine organizational and contextual conditions which affect
an organization's ability to interact with only those organizations which
it perceives as being instrumental to its success.
The correlation of +.36 for the other interaction term, low linkages/
high importance, is somewhat troubling. We expected that agencies which
were not interacting with organizations which were perceived as having
high instrumental value would report the same sense of powerlessness that
4Controlling for the "main effects" of number of linkages and per-
ceived importance of the task environment.

-22-
we found in the high linkages /low importance condition. It appears, how-
ever, that just the opposite is the case. In reflecting on this anomalous
result we wondered if agencies which are unable to establish linkages with
a large number of highly important organizations might be able to compensate
for this lack of total access by increasing the intensity of the linkages
which they are able to initiate. If the relatively few linkages established
with important organizations each represent a highly intense exchange re-
lationship then the focal organization may report that it is able to con-
trol its environment, as reflected by the +.36 correlation in Table 2.
To test this possibility we used an analysis of variance test to measure
the relationship between the two dimensions number of linkages and per-
ceived importance and three measures of linkage intensity which reflect
the number of different client and institutional services provided by
the interacting organizations. The master list of organizations survey
asked each agency head to identify the number of different services pro-
vided by each interacting organization for the focal agency's referrals.
These included counseling, basic education classes, medical or rehabil-
itative services, on the job training, job placement, diagnosis and
testing, and vocational training. They were also asked to identify all
institutional services they received from each interacting organization.
These included funding, physical facilities for offices or training,
and assistance in program planning and development.
The third measure of intensity was a composite of all client and
institutional services provided by the interacting organization. Follow-
ing Marrett's (1971) definition, the intensity of a relationship was
based on the number of services provided by the interacting organization.
.•
,3 >
-23-
For instance, if a manpower organization is sending its clients to agency
A for diagnostic testing, counseling and job placement and its staff is
also receiving assistance on program development that is a more intense
relationship than one with agency B which is only providing counseling
services
.
This analysis indicated a strong main effect for perceived importance
for 2 of the 3 measures of intensity and a consistent pattern for the third*.
The main effect for number of lin kages and the interaction effect were not
significant. These results indicate that the intensity of a relationship is
based on the perceived importance of the interacting organizations. It is
particularly interesting to note that the highest mean value for all three
measures occurs in the high importance/low linkages condition. This
provides support for our supposition that increased intensity is used as
a strategy for controlling the environment when the focal organization
is not able to interact with all the organizations it perceives as being
important. This result again reinforces the utility of studying the
conditions which enhance an organization's ability to establish linkages
with organizations it perceives as being instrumental to its success.
Implications and Conclusions
There are several implications of these findings for agency and pro-
gram administration. First of all, they point out the substantial impact
of federal (or state) level program policies on the administration of
local agencies. In Whetten and Aldrich (1977) we found that the best
*Institutional services F=7.42 (1,47) p£.01 ; Total services (client
+ institutional) f*3.86 (1,47) pj£.05
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predictors of organization set size and diversity were those most diffi-
cult for agency heads to manipulate. This appears to also be the case
for organization set optimization since the two best predictors for
INSTVALUE, budget and breadth of services, are essentially predetermined
before the local administrator enters the picture. Unfortunately it is
very difficult to make an unequivocal statement regarding the effect of
budget size on interorganizational relations. This is due to the fact
that on the one hand a large budget has been shown to lead to a diversi-
fied organization set (Whetten and Aldrich, 1976), which is perceived by
the agency director as being beneficial to the organization. However, it
also appears that a small budget produces a more efficient utilization of
financial resources by avoiding the problem of accumulating a large number
of linkages with organizations of low importance. This apparent paradox
faced by program administrators bears further research before a definitive
conclusion can be reached.
A second implication of these results is that the decision by program
heads to mandate a relationship between certain local agencies may also
prove to be a mixed blessing to these agencies. While Aldrich (1977) and
Hall et al. (1974) have shown that mandating a relationship increases the
frequency of interaction between the organizations, we suspect that it
might also produce in an agency a perception of low power over its environ-
ment. This concern is borne out in Hall et al.'s (1974) research inasmuch
as he found that the correlation between mandated relations and the power
of the focal organization was .15 whereas the correlation between man-
dated relations and the perceived power of the interacting organization
was .49. An illustration of this phenomenon appeared in Benson et al.'s
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(1973) research on relations between manpower organizations. They found
that a welfare agency was deliberately flooding a rehabilitation agency
with referrals which would create high administrative costs and a low
success rate as part of their strategy for increasing their share of the
distribution of resources within the network of community organizations.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that under these conditions organiza-
tions view the relationship as a threat to their autonomy and consequently
are reluctant to maintain more than a token relationship (Whetten, 1977a;
Crow, 1970; Mansur et al., 1967). These results suggests that the current
trend toward decentralization of manpower services which gives administra-
tors of local agencies more latitude to adapt their program (including who
they interact with) to local conditions will instill in their staff
greater confidence in their ability to control their task environment.
Implications for future research and further theoretical development
2 .
are also evident. First, it is evident from the rather modest R in
Table 1 that much of the variance in INSTVALUE remains unaccounted for.
Therefore, while this research has generated some information regarding
the factors which influence the establishment of environment controlling
linkages we recognize that considerably more research on this topic must
be conducted. Hopefully this work will stimulate more research in this
area. In this regard it would seem particularly fruitful for future
studies to include measures of the qualitative characteristics of the
exchange processes within the organization set. Marrett (1971) has
identified four key dimensions of interorganizational relations: inten-
sity, reciprocity, formalization and standarization. While a few re-
searchers have examined the relationships between these dimensions as
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well as their effects on various outcome varibles such as cooperation
and conflict (Hall, 1974; Van de Ven, 1976; Schermerhom, 1975; and
Aldrich, 1976), this area of research is still relatively untapped.
In the context of the present study, it would be instructive to examine
the moderating effect of standardization on the relationship between set
size and INSTVALUE since a standardized relationship would require fewer
resources to maintain. Presumably an organization could therefore ef-
fectively handle a larger organization set if the linkages were highly
standardized.
Our results suggest that more research also need to be conducted on
the effects of interorganizational relationships. We have demonstrated
that under some conditions linkages appear to have dysfunctional conse-
quences. Further research on the costs as well as the benefits of inter-
organizational relations would seem warranted.
Lastly, these results and those from Whetten and Aldrich (1977) sug-
gest the need for further research on the utility of applying the resource
control model to the organization set level of analysis. It appears that
while the most important determinants of the composition of an organiza-
tion set are difficult for administrators to control, under certain
conditions the decision to establish resource-controlling linkages may
follow the highly deliberate and thoughtful process implicit in the re-
source control theory. We feel that testing the limits of a prevailing
paradigm is an important scholarly pursuit and doubly so in an emerging
field like interorganizational relations where the establishment of a
sound theoretical foundation is the key to our future progress.
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APPENBIX I
SECTORS OF ORGANIZATIONS IN COMMUNITY
The nine sectors of organizations in the communities which comprise
the agency's environment in this study are:
1. Other manpower programs that are state or federally funded;
2. Educations training, and employment organizations, e.g., school
and employment information centers;
3. Economic assistance organizations, e.g., social services
departments or the F.H.A.
;
4. Public safety organizations, e.g., police and fire departments;
5. Recreation and entertainment organizations, e.g., Boy's Clubs
or youth camps;
6. Medical and health care organizations, e.g., hospitals and
nursing homes;
7. General social service organisations, e.g., Family Services,
Senior Citizens Information Service, or the Salvation Army;
8. Administration, research, and central planning organizations,
e.g., the mayor's office, city planning departments; and,
9. Special interest organizations, e.g.. NAACP, Mental Health
Association, the Better Business Bureau, the AFL-CIO.
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APPENDIX II
OPERATIONALIZATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Organization Set Size : The total number of local organizations, public
and non-profit, with which a focal manpower organization interacts.
Budget : The amount of money allocated to an agency for the 1972-73 fiscal
year by the state or federal government » Since the individual Employ-
ment Service offices did not have a separate budget their operating
expenses were figured by multiplying their number of staff times an
average salary and overhead amount supplied by the state office.
This variable was logged.
Breadth of Services Offered : Staff members were asked how often they
dealt with the following aspects of their clients' lives: Medical
problems, Family relationship, Other social problems (e.g., related
fco their work or neighborhood), Economic problems , Educational needs,
and experience* Psychological characteristics, Plans and dreams.
Four response categories ranged from "Every time we meet with them"
to "Never."
Voluntary Association Memberships : The average number of community or
civic action organizations (e.g., NAACP, Settlement House Board)
the staff members belong to. This variable was logged.
Previous Jobs : The average number of previous jobs the staff held in
the following types of organizations: Employment Service, other
manpower organizations, business organizations, public agencies,
education organizations, other community service type organiza-
tions. This variable was logged.
Communications : The number of regularly scheduled meetings within an
organization per month. This variable was logged.
Centralization: The staff members' average response regarding how often
they participated in making the following decisions: (1) To pro-
mote any of the non-clerical staff; (2) To hire new staff members;
(3) To adopt new policies; and (4) To adopt new programs.
Responses were coded on a 5-point scale from "Never" to "Always".
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TABLE 2; CORRELATION BETWEEN ORGANIZATION SET
CHARACTERISTICS AKD PERCEIVED CONTROL OVER
THE ENVIRONMENT
-—" ..... — . , .. 1— '
Organization Set
Characteristics
Perceived Organizational
Control over Environment
Concentration of
Organization Set +.28*
Size of Organization
Set +.38*
Perceived Importance
of Task Environment -.05
Interaction Term: Large
Organization Set and Low
Perceived Importance -.48**+
Interaction Term: Low Number
of Linkages and High Perceived
Importance +.36**+
*P 1 '05
**P £ «0i
***p <_ .001
Controlling for Size of Organization Set and
Perceived Importance of Task Environment
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FIGURE 1: HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE FACTORS WHICH
INFLUENCE THE GOODNESS OF FIT BETWEEN INSTRUMENTAL
VALUE AND NUMBER OF LINKAGES
1. The need to be selective in
choosing interacting organiza
tions due to:
a. small budget
b. broad range of services
2. The opportunity to establish
linkages with important
organizations due to visibility
created by:
a. staff's membership in
voluntary organizations
b. staff's previous jobs in
other organizations
The opportunity to discontinue
unimportant linkages as a re-
sult of having a:
c. small organization set
Correlation between the
instrumental value of a
group of organizations
and the number of linkages
with them
The appropriate decisiou making
mechanisms as reflected by:
a. frequent staff meetings
b. centralization of
authority
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